Reuters uncovers 5,000-entity Iranian procurement network

On 29 October 2026, Reuters reported that Iran had used more than 5,000 numbered military agencies to procure hardware, explosives and dual-use goods through a network extending across several jurisdictions.

Reuters and 240 Analytics identified the agencies through shared registration details and traced them across Iranian bank and government records, corporate filings, invoices, bills of lading and about 19,000 import records. One agency, MOD 346428, was linked to $2.3 billion in imports between January 2025 and June 2026.

Reuters found no evidence that the numbered agencies it reviewed had been designated by Western governments. It also reported that 97% of the reviewed shipments were settled without a cross-border currency transfer, with overseas intermediaries and front companies using funds held abroad. Iranian entities contacted did not respond; several foreign companies said they had no knowledge of, or control over, third-party exports. U.S. Treasury reporting has separately described how MODAFL uses foreign cover companies and exchange houses to move oil revenue and procure materiel.

The investigation shows why a clean sanctions-screening result is not the same as low sanctions risk. A counterparty may be absent from a list while sharing identifiers, funding routes or trade relationships with a sanctioned network.

KYB controls need to connect company records with bank relationships, invoices, shipping data, suppliers, end users and payment methods. Shared addresses, incorporation details or intermediaries can turn apparently separate entities into one risk picture.

That picture also changes over time. Newly discovered links, trade routes or counterparties should trigger continuous monitoring and a documented reassessment rather than waiting for a formal designation.